UNITED STATES

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549

 

FORM N-CSR

 

CERTIFIED SHAREHOLDER REPORT OF REGISTERED MANAGEMENT

INVESTMENT COMPANIES

 

Investment Company Act file number 811-5976

 

Seligman Select Municipal Fund, Inc.

(Exact name of Registrant as specified in charter)

 

734 Ameriprise Financial Center

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55474

(Address of principal executive offices) (Zip code)

 

Lawrence P. Vogel

100 Park Avenue

New York, New York 10017

(Name and address of agent for service)


Registrant’s telephone number, including area code:      (212) 850-1864



Date of fiscal year end:    12/31


Date of reporting period:    12/31/08


FORM N-CSR

 

ITEM 1.

REPORTS TO STOCKHOLDERS.

 



    
To The Stockholders

Dear Fellow Stockholders,

We are very pleased to announce that, with the completion of the acquisition of J. & W. Seligman & Co. Incorporated by RiverSource Investments, LLC on November 7, 2008, your Fund joined the RiverSource family of funds. Seligman’s long heritage of investing and exceptional wealth of experience is a valuable addition to RiverSource Funds. Seligman joins RiverSource and Threadneedle in the comprehensive family of mutual funds we offer investors.

We also welcome John Maher and Leroy Richie, who have each served on your Fund’s Board since 2006 and 2000, respectively, to the RiverSource Funds’ Board of Directors. The acquisition of Seligman by RiverSource Investments creates several new opportunities for us all, including access to talented portfolio managers and competitive mutual fund solutions to help you reach your investment goals.

On February 5, 2009, at a Special Meeting of Stockholders of the Fund, a proposal was approved that will result in the acquisition of the Fund’s assets by Seligman National Municipal Fund. This acquisition is expected to be completed on or about March 27, 2009. Holders of Seligman Select Municipal Fund’s common stock will receive, as consideration for their shares, Class A shares of Seligman National Municipal Fund with a value equal to the net asset value of their shares of Seligman Select Municipal Fund on the closing date of the acquisition. Redemptions and exchanges of Class A Shares of Seligman National Municipal Fund, issued pursuant to the acquisition, will be subject to a redemption fee of 2% for a period of one year following the closing of the acquisition. The outstanding shares of preferred stock of Seligman Select Municipal Fund will be redeemed prior to the consummation of the acquisition. Shares of Seligman Select Municipal Fund’s common stock will cease to be traded on the New York Stock Exchange prior to the opening of trading on or about March 23, 2009.

We thank you for your support and look forward to helping you reach your investment goals.



Stephen R. Lewis, Jr.
Chairman of the Boards


Patrick T. Bannigan
President, RiverSource Funds

    



    
Table of Contents

Interview With Your Portfolio Managers
                 1    
Performance and Portfolio Overview
                 5    
Portfolio of Investments
                 7    
Statement of Assets and Liabilities
                 12    
Statement of Operations
                 13    
Statements of Changes in Net Assets
                 14    
Statement of Cash Flows
                 15    
Notes to Financial Statements
                 16    
Financial Highlights
                 22    
Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm
                 24    
Matters Relating to the Directors’ Consideration of the Approval of the Investment
Management Services Agreement
                 25    
Proxy Results
                 31    
Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Acquisition of Seligman Select Municipal Fund
                 33    
Dividend Investment Plan
                 34    
Directors and Officers
                 36    
Additional Fund Information
                 40    
 


Interview With Your Portfolio Managers
Thomas G. Moles and Eileen A. Comerford

Q.
What market conditions and economic events materially impacted Seligman Select Municipal Fund, Inc.’s investment results during the year?

A.
The year 2008 was the most eventful period in the Fund’s eighteen-year history as the ongoing credit crisis presented significant challenges to investment professionals and individual investors alike. The municipal market was one of the last sectors of the financial industry to become swept up the credit crisis. The catalyst was the downgrade of Financial Guarantee Insurance Co. (FGIC) in January 2008. FGIC, one of the top four municipal bond insurers — lost its coveted triple-A rating due to its exposure to mortgage-backed securities. It was at this point that the municipal market began to experience the extraordinary volatility and dislocation that was occurring in most other sectors of the financial market.

The municipal market had hardly begun to deal with the negative implications of the FGIC downgrade when it was forced to contend with the collapse of the auction rate securities (ARS) market. Investors, concerned about liquidity, were increasingly avoiding any money market product that lacked a liquidity back-stop — an assurance the vehicles’ obligations will be repaid when they are tendered even if they cannot be resold — including ARS. Remarketing agents were reluctant, due to their own capital constraints, to provide the degree of support needed to prevent auction failures. Investors who owned ARS were unable to tender the securities, a risk which many had never considered. The states and municipalities that had issued ARS were forced to pay a penalty rate — a condition of the auction failures. Through the combined efforts of the financial industry, government officials and regulatory authorities, significant progress was made in 2008 in redeeming investors’ ARS holdings.

In June, MBIA and AMBAC, two monoline insurance companies, lost their triple-A ratings, which was also due to exposure to mortgage-backed securities. The sudden loss of high-quality investments made it extremely difficult for money market funds, which are prohibited from purchasing securities rated below double-A, to locate a sufficient supply of securities to meet their needs. This led to a spike in yields on money market securities rated single-A and lower.

Throughout the summer, the continuing deterioration in the housing market led to a high degree of anxiety about the financial health of government sponsored mortgage corporations Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association, or FNMA) and Freddie Mac (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association, or FHLMC). The fear of a complete collapse of the financial markets prompted the US government to provide a guarantee to holders of FNMA and FHLMC debt.

As the third quarter of 2008 progressed, conditions worsened. The economy was showing signs of rapid deceleration, which affected stock market performance. State and local finances were weakening, prompting further risk aversion in the market. The stunning collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September created severe repercussions across all financial markets. The Reserve Primary Fund, a large money market fund, had exposure to Lehman Brothers at the time of its failure, which caused the fund’s share price to fall below $1.00 — a rare occurrence. A run on the fund ensued, which was soon followed by an exodus from other money market funds

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Interview With Your Portfolio Managers
Thomas G. Moles and Eileen A. Comerford


— even those with no exposure to Lehman Brothers. In an effort to ease the panic, the US government agreed to guarantee certain money market deposits.

The Lehman Brothers debacle contributed to an extreme degree of volatility and illiquidity in longer-dated municipal bonds, pushing yields sharply higher. Many leveraged players were forced to unwind, placing further downward pressure on bond prices. A number of municipal bond funds experienced heavy redemptions due to plummeting net asset values, forcing additional selling by the funds. As rising long-term yields approached eight-year highs, buyers began to return to the market to take advantage of attractive levels. As year-end approached, much of the imbalance between supply and demand had dissipated and yields began to retreat.

Throughout the past year, the Federal Reserve and US Treasury have been creating a series of new facilities aimed at easing the liquidity crisis and encouraging lending. The programs have had varying degrees of success but the ultimate goal of restoring investor confidence has, to date, eluded them. Subsequent to year-end, the new administration has proposed a massive stimulus package, in addition to several new programs. It will be some time before we can determine the efficacy of the latest efforts to stabilize the credit markets and reverse the economic decline.

Turmoil in the credit markets led to widespread failures of preferred share auctions and remarketings at the start of the year. The Fund, which had never had a remarketing failure since its preferred shares were issued in 1990, experienced its first failure in February 2008. Although the failures continued throughout the rest of the year, preferred shareholders continued to receive scheduled dividends at a penalty rate. As a result of a settlement with the New York State Attorney General’s office in August 2008, Citigroup, the Fund’s preferred share remarketing agent, offered to purchase at par auction rate securities, including the Fund’s preferred shares, from all Citigroup individual investors, small institutions, and charities by November 2008.

During 2008, the Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) lowered the federal funds rate, in a series of policy actions, from 4.25% at the start of the year to 0.25% by year-end. The Fund’s preferred share dividend rates are reset as a percentage of financial commercial paper rates, which remained elevated throughout most of last year despite the efforts of the Fed to stabilize the credit markets. It wasn’t until November that preferred rates began to more closely align with federal funds’ levels and the Fund’s Common Stockholders benefited from the widening of spreads between the Fund’s preferred dividend rates and investment income.

Q.
What investment strategies or techniques materially impacted the Fund’s performance during the year?

A.
In 2008, we focused on positioning the Fund for a reversal of several prevailing trends in the municipal market that we believed could not be sustained, specifically: falling long-term yields, narrowing yield curve slope, tight credit quality spreads and declining relative value versus US Treasuries. During 2008, long-term yields rose to the highest level in eight years, credit spreads widened dramatically, the municipal yield curve steepened by

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Interview With Your Portfolio Managers
Thomas G. Moles and Eileen A. Comerford


over 275 basis points, and the relative value of municipal bonds rose to the highest level on record.

To protect the Fund from an anticipated increase in interest rates, we set a higher target level for cash balances. Further, we elected to retain our pre-refunded and escrowed-to-maturity holdings. Refunded bonds are typically escrowed with US government securities, making them relatively safe and highly liquid investments. For the 12-months ended December 31, 2008, the prerefunded bond sector of the Barclay’s Capital Municipal Bond Index (formerly the Lehman Brothers Municipal Bond Index) (the “Index”) was the best performing sector.

In a rising interest rate environment, longer-maturity bonds are more sensitive to yield changes than shorter-maturity bonds. Given our expectation for interest rates to trend higher, we concentrated new purchases in the intermediate maturity sector — considerably shorter than in years past. For the year ended December 31, 2008, the worst performing maturity sector was for maturities of 22 years and longer. The best performing maturity sector was for maturities of 1–8 years. Our avoidance of the longest maturity bonds contributed to our competitive investment returns; however, the Fund would have had stronger results had a greater percentage of holdings been invested at the shorter end of the yield curve.

Portfolio acquisitions were comprised of premium coupon bonds (i.e., bonds trading above par), which are inherently more defensive than discount coupon bonds (i.e., bonds trading below par). Additionally, the Fund has maintained an overweight in premium coupon bonds. The premium bond sector of the Index substantially outperformed the current coupon, discount bond, and zero coupon sectors.

The Fund’s portfolio is diversified among 22 states and is concentrated in essential service sectors, including water and sewer bonds, electric utilities and transportation projects. Generally, these sectors tend to have stable revenue streams and the vital nature of the projects and services they provide can help to insulate the bonds during periods of economic weakness.

The credit crisis has had a significant impact on credit quality yield spreads. For many years, steadily declining interest rates led investors to seek out lower quality bonds given their relatively higher yields. Eventually, the increased demand for the sector, as well as strong credit trends, caused the yield spread between high-quality and low quality to narrow to historical lows. Since the credit turmoil began, investors have become more quality conscious, which has contributed to a dramatic widening of credit spreads, particularly within the high-yield sector. Another reason for the increase in quality yield spread has been the downgrades of the municipal monoline insurers. During 2008, the top four insurers lost at least one, if not all, of their triple-A ratings. As a result, high quality bonds are now in short supply and are trading at a premium. The non-investment grade sector was the worst performing sector of the Index in 2008.

The Fund is permitted to purchase only investment-grade bonds (i.e., bonds rated within the four highest rating categories). We have always viewed insurance as an enhancement and will not purchase a bond unless we approve the underlying credit. Therefore, while we were disappointed

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Interview With Your Portfolio Managers
Thomas G. Moles and Eileen A. Comerford


with the monoline insurer downgrades, we were not compelled to sell any bonds as a result.

In keeping with our emphasis on quality, we endeavor not to participate in sectors of the market that historically have been more prone to credit deterioration, such as tobacco bonds, airline debt, automotive industry bonds, nursing homes, convention centers and stadium facilities. The high-yield sector has had a difficult year, declining by 27.01%. Additionally, the Fund was underweight in hospital, housing, pollution control bonds, areas that underperformed in the revenue bond sector of the Index.


The views and opinions expressed are those of the Portfolio Manager(s), are provided for general information only, and do not constitute specific tax, legal, or investment advice to, or recommendations for, any person. There can be no guarantee as to the accuracy of market forecasts. Opinions, estimates, and forecasts may be changed without notice. 

A Team Approach

Seligman Select Municipal Fund, Inc. is managed by the Seligman Municipal Team, headed by Thomas G. Moles. Mr. Moles and Co-Portfolio Manager Eileen A. Comerford are assisted in the management of the Fund by a group of seasoned professionals who are responsible for research and trading consistent with the Fund’s investment objective. Team members include Senior Credit Analyst Audrey Kuchtyak and Steven Hallac.