ADVFN Logo ADVFN

We could not find any results for:
Make sure your spelling is correct or try broadening your search.

Trending Now

Toplists

It looks like you aren't logged in.
Click the button below to log in and view your recent history.

Hot Features

Registration Strip Icon for default Register for Free to get streaming real-time quotes, interactive charts, live options flow, and more.

Wells Fargo - the analysis of a strong bank by Warren Buffett in 1990?

Share On Facebook
share on Linkedin
Print

Warren Buffett was optimistic about Wells Fargo’s prospects in 1989/90.  He was so optimistic that he spent $289m of Berkshire Hathaway’s money buying almost 10% of Wells Fargo’s shares.  But we have to ask: Was Warren correct to be greedy when others were fearful? There are two parts to answering this question.

First, did the facts from the recent past support the idea that it was unlikely Wells Fargo would suffer significant losses in the Californian recession?

Second, does the evidence in the period after 1990 show a successful recovery after the dip?

I’ll tackle the first element today and the second tomorrow.  (This case study shows the main metrics used to evaluate banking shares today)

How strong was Wells Fargo in the 1980s?

Carl Reichardt, having joined the company in 1970, became chairman and CEO of Wells Fargo in December 1982, so we’ll trace its performance from then.  Reichardt, ably assisted by vice chairman Paul Hazen, built a well-deserved reputation for controlling costs.  Even once expenses were well under the norm for the banking industry he refused to relent.

A key measure in this area is non-interest expense, such as employment and property costs, as a percentage of total revenue.  Revenue is net interest plus non-interest income such as fees for managing investments and bank account charges.

It is clear from a comparison of Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 that Wells Fargo ran a much tighter ship than the average US bank. The average bank in the mid- to late-1980s tended to stay within the range of spending 66 – 69c of every dollar it received in revenue on running costs.  At Wells Fargo Reichardt and Hazen managed to reduce the spend from over 70c per dollar of revenue in 1983 to a mere 53.6c in 1989.

Figure 1.1. US commercial banks’ noninterest expense as a percentage of total revenue 1985 – 1997 

Figure 1.2 Wells Fargo noninterest expense as a percentage of total revenue 1983 – 1989

Source: Wells Fargo Annual Reports and Accounts

When revenue is measured in billions a percentage point saving can make a huge difference to profits. This is reflected in the returns on common shareholders’ equity and the return on asset numbers.  Whereas the US banking sector as a whole achieved returns on equity of roughly  10% – 11% in the period 1983 -89 (excepting the bad year of 1987)  – see Figure 1.3 – the Wells Fargo team generated between 12.51% and 14.81% returns for shareholders in the mid-1980s, and then raised their game dramatically in the last two years of the 1980s to RoE’s of 23.99% and 24.49%, far above the industry averages – see Figure 1.4.

A similar profitability superiority is shown in the returns on total assets (assets being all those loans and other rights held by Wells Fargo) in Figure 1.5. Whereas the commercial banking sector made profits of around 0.6% – 0.7% as a percentage of assets in the 1980s Wells Fargo lifted its RoA to 1.14% in 1988 and 1.26% in 1989.

Figure 1.3. US commercial banks’ average return on equity and average return on assets 1970 – 1997

Figure 1.4 Wells Fargo return on equity, %, 1983 -89

Source: Wells Fargo Annual Reports

………………To read more subscribe to my premium newsletter Deep Value Shares – click here http://newsletters.advfn.com/deepvalueshares/subscribe-1

CLICK HERE TO REGISTER FOR FREE ON ADVFN, the world's leading stocks and shares information website, provides the private investor with all the latest high-tech trading tools and includes live price data streaming, stock quotes and the option to access 'Level 2' data on all of the world's key exchanges (LSE, NYSE, NASDAQ, Euronext etc).

This area of the ADVFN.com site is for independent financial commentary. These blogs are provided by independent authors via a common carrier platform and do not represent the opinions of ADVFN Plc. ADVFN Plc does not monitor, approve, endorse or exert editorial control over these articles and does not therefore accept responsibility for or make any warranties in connection with or recommend that you or any third party rely on such information. The information available at ADVFN.com is for your general information and use and is not intended to address your particular requirements. In particular, the information does not constitute any form of advice or recommendation by ADVFN.COM and is not intended to be relied upon by users in making (or refraining from making) any investment decisions. Authors may or may not have positions in stocks that they are discussing but it should be considered very likely that their opinions are aligned with their trading and that they hold positions in companies, forex, commodities and other instruments they discuss.

Leave A Reply

 
Do you want to write for our Newspaper? Get in touch: newspaper@advfn.com