Rodney5
5 hours ago
This “Separate Account plan” kindly, explain to us how this will unfold. And when will this take place?
You calculate “An adjusted $402B core capital shortfall as of end of 2023.” What I understand from your perspective is the shortfall is by reason of the outstanding Senior Preferred Stock with the Liquidation Preference. Are you saying the SPS LP will be cancelled?
My understanding is Fannie Mae had a GAAP positive net worth of $78 billion at YE23, the Enterprise Regulatory Capital Framework excludes the stated value of the senior preferred stock ($120.8 billion), as well as a portion of deferred tax assets, resulting in the Company being significantly undercapitalized. Indeed, at YE23, the shortfall to adjusted capital requirements totaled $243 billion, with the Company reporting negative regulatory capital ratios given deficit for each tier of capital. Given covenants under the PA, Fannie Mae also does not have access to equity funding except through draws from the U.S. Treasury (and only when total liabilities exceed total assets).
Wise Man
9 hours ago
Now, hit this wall: Definition of Core Capital 12U.S.Code§4502(7)
This is the FHEFSSA, not the U.S. Code:
Retained Earnings account is core capital. The only account that absorbs the future (unexpected) losses (the other Loan Loss Reserve -ALLL- is for expected losses -CECL accounting standard-. ALLL shows up as Asset writedown, that is, it assumes that the loss already occurred. Though it isn't true and that's why it's recorded as Tier 2 Capital for the Total Capital that has to meet the Risk-Based Capital requirement)
Today, the Retained Earnings accounts stand at an adjusted $-216B ($-91B officially on their Balance Sheets), adjusted for the offset (reduction of Retained Earnings) for the $125B worth of SPS LP increased for free (without getting the corresponding cash) since December 2017, with the masterminds of this 3rd phase of the Separate Account, Mnuchin/Trump, when they agreed with the FHFA director at the time, Mel Watt, on $3B gifted SPS on December 2017, when the Applicable Capital Reserve was raised to $3B.
Then it continued with Calabria on the September 2019 PA amendment and the latest, on the January 2021 amendment with the fraudulent concept "Capital Reserve End Date": when the capital requirements are met with Capital Reserve, and badly assessed, because of the offset mentioned (adjusted CR = $0)
It's the Core Capital the one that meets the Minimum Leverage Capital requirement, as per the definition of Capital Classification of Undercapitalized.
An adjusted $402B core capital shortfall as of end of 2023.
So much for "rehabilitation".
Mnuchin/Trump and Watt simply looked up the definition of capital distributions posted before, which are restricted, and when judge Willett called them out, unware that there is a Separate Account plan behind and in a half-baked ruling commented before, stating, about the NWS dividend, "that kind of liquidation exceeded the powers of the conservator", 3 weeks later they picked a different compensation to UST, notwithstanding that it's the same Common Equity Sweep as before, as we can see in:
- The Income Statement: Net Income less dividends or other compensation to UST, equals $0 Net Income Attributable to Common Shareholders. That is, $0 EPS.
- The Balance Sheet: here we can't see it here, because this SPS LP increased for free and its offset, are missing (Financial Statement fraud). But have a look to this adjusted Net Worth activity table, to see how it plays out. The Common Equity is always held in escrow, in order to uphold the Rehab power.
In the best interests of the Agency: mess around, in a conspiracy with the crooked litigants and Co.
Wise Man
10 hours ago
You shamelessly conceal that the UPMOST judge, justice Alito, began his interpretation of the FHFA-C's Incidental Power: "Rehabilitate FnF in a way....".
By the way, this comes after judge Sweeney's interpretation of this provision, deleted the words "authorized by this section", so she could read "take any action in the best interests of the FHFA", ending up with "the FHFA is the government". She was called out and renamed "The Tipp-Ex Queen", and it's when the big boys stepped in to give a proper interpretation of the written text. Primarily because take their capital away is NOT authorized by this section (a breach of the FHFA-C's Rehab power, knowning that "may" is imperative in legislation, once the capital has been generated, and not a choice. Already commented.)
Justice Alito was just making clear what judge Willett stated in a prior ruling (5th Cir.) over the same Collins case and regarding the same provision: "Any action within the enumerated powers".
Therefore, the savy Justice Alito simply looked for the FHFA-C's Powers, something that judge Willett missed, and determined that it's about the rehabilitation of FnF, when he read: "Put FnF in a sound and solvent condition", because he knows that the soundness in a financial company is measured with the Capital levels, where the Retained Earnings are recorded as Core Capital. And solvency (ability to meet the obligations) is suitable for the reduction of the SPS (obligations in respect of Capital Stock) and restore their capital levels as well.
Both are, precisely, the exceptions to the Restriction on Capital Distributions.
Then, we can come to the conclusion that the Restriction on Capital Distributions is a tool to achieve the FHFA-C's Rehab power.
This is why the FHFA's Power is also called "the Rehab power" or the "Recap power".
You have just posted justice Alito's add-on "and the public it serves" in your piecemeal approach (The Tipp-Ex gang), that stretches the interpretation of the FHFA-C's Incidental Power, useful to use FnF for government policies and to put an example, it would allow the Congress to keep the estimated $15B it owes to FnF for managing Obama's Making Home Affordable program (HAMP and HARP), that even made FnF advance the payments to borrowers and servicers (banks), with the promise that they would be reimbursed for this cost with TARP funds, but it didn't happen.
Also, the utilization of the hedge funds as a tool for government policies, after Trump approved the debt forgiveness plan (the short-sales that DeMarco prohibited), forcing FnF to sell their NPL and RPL to the hedge funds at a deep discount, because it contains a clause that includes debt forgiveness, and with the collateral (properties) valued sky high given away. This is an incentive to prompt manufactured crisis.
Fannie Mae. Sale of RPL:
purchasers must offer delinquent borrowers a waterfall of loss mitigation options, including loan modifications, which may include principal forgiveness, prior to initiating foreclosure on any loan. Source.
This is fine. Once the dust settles, we will bring it up as windfalls for the UST, knowing that what is the bailout, it will net $0 as per the Charter Act (the amount of cumulative dividend on SPS , with a weighted-average 1.8% rate and applying a 0.5% spread over Treasuries, is netted out with the interests on the $152B cash owed to FnF)
The first part of his sentence that we are talking about, "Rehabilitate FnF in a way, although not in the interests of FnF (on paper -Balance Sheet-, just watching their awful ERCF tables you know why), it's beneficial to the Agency". We see how the justice twisted the text as it's written, just what he was told, in order to play the game of the hedge funds and private equity firms about a "Government theft story" that is what is making the stocks trade at rock bottom prices (stock price manipulation), because with "beneficial", the justice wanted to transmit the idea of "monetary benefit", when the written text states "in the best interests", and the interests in a regulatory agency are always related to activities in the regulated entities, no one can think of depleting their regulatory capital, by taking their money away in broad daylight.
BOTTOM LINE
What justice Alito was really allowing, is the rehabilitation of FnF in a Separate Account that resembles the one carried out by Congress and the FHFA in 1989 with the FHLBanks, for the repayment of principal of the RefCorp obligation, and with an extended version for their recapitalization. Either on purpose or inadvertently, because no matter how you spin the law, all roads lead to Rome.
Now we are talking.
CET1 > 2.5% of Adjusted Total Assets as of end of 2023. Even it was achieved a 25% of the Prescribed Capital Buffer under the Table 8: Payout ratio, for the resumption of dividend payments (Capital Buffer = amount of capital above the threshold Tier 1 Capital > 2.5% of ATA), after the redemption of the JPS (AT1 Capital) with the 4Q 2023 reports of the laggard Fannie Mae.
Achiving the FHFA's will of expulsion of the unwanted Equity holders in FnF (The bulk of JPS holders are hedge funds and Community Banks) in the run up to unveiling the Privatized Housing Finance System we were bound for, since it was chosen by the UST for the release from conservatorship, in a Report to Congress dated February 2011, at the request of the Dodd-Frank law.
The same "membership cleansing" was carried out by the FHFA with the FHLBanks in a Final Rule of 2016.
Wise Man
12 hours ago
You continue to hit the wall of the Restriction on Capital Distributions and its exception (pay down the SPS) U.S.Code §4614(e), along with the exception added in "the supplemental" on July 20, 2011 CFR 1237.12 (Recapitalization in a separate account, either in the exception 1, 2, 3 and 4, because it (c) supplements and it shall not replace or affect the Restriction on Capital Distribution by the statue I began this comment with, which is meant for the recapitalization as well, because when you pay down the SPS, you are recapitalizing FnF at the same time, as the SPS are pay down with normal cash and they aren't core capital, whereas the posting on Retained Earnings stays, Core Capital)
At the same time, the FHFA is complying with its Power of Recapitalization and also improving their Solvency with the reduction of SPS.
"(May) put FnF in a sound and solvent condition".
When "may" is imperative once the capital has been generated, and it's only to give the conservator some leeway to carry out activities or actions (upholding the law, obviously. It wasn't turned into an outlaw Agency).
The Restriction on Capital Distributions is written in stone.
The same as the penalty on all those individuals that have covered it up in formal documents: court briefs including Amicus briefs, GSE slides, "letters to my partners", articles, books, etc., as long as these documents are publicly available
The obsession to conceal the FHEFSSA, so that the definitions regarding capital go unnoticed, is of epic proportions.
Like the very Mnuchin's Treasury Department:
Something that people should have learned beforehand, in order to make decisions about FnF, that's why to become FHFA director is required a deep understanding in financial matters.
The judges are providing the alibi to not unveil the Separate Account plan. That is, playing the fool with the pomp of a black robe.
Now, hit this wall too. CAPITAL DISTRIBUTION: Dividends, today's SPS increased for free and the Lamberth rebated added later in #3 through regulation CFR 1229.13.