BRUSSELS, May 17, 2018 /PRNewswire-PRWeb/ -- Eurosmart has
noted the publication from Gildas
Avoine (Rennes University, INSA Rennes) and Loïc Ferreira
(Orange Labs) on the potential Vulnerability on the SCP02 protocol,
published yesterday on the TCES Website.
This new publication reports a known attack but applied in a new
context.
For a long time, Eurosmart has been recommending that additional
security measures should be added to SCP02, such as e.g.,
pre-encrypting sensitive data, restricting the usage to trusted
environments, or other means that are appropriate to enhance the
security of SCP02.
Please find here below a Q&A developing more in detail the
questions that you may have as Eurosmart technology end-user.
Eurosmart is committed to developing, promoting and maintaining the
appropriate security level for its products, solutions and
protocols.
Eurosmart Q&A:
Q1: What can we do from this attack? What we cannot do?
What is retrieved is the said plaintext (not the key) and from only
one card.
A pre-encrypted data cannot be retrieved in clear.
Q2: What are the conditions to perform this attack?
The conditions for performing the attack on SCP02 are as
follows:
- Attacker must be able to intercept and
modify messages between server and card in open environment;
- Attacker must be able to perform
precise timing measurement (wrong padding or good padding) with
access either to the device or ability to load spy malware;
- The same plain text must be sent
enciphered several times (around 128 times to disclose one single
byte of information either to different cards with different keys
or to the same card with different session keys).
Q3: What are the type of product applicable/not applicable to
this attack?
Attack is not applicable to the electrical personalization of
banking applets (all sensitive data are over encrypted).
Attack is not applicable if personalisation is done in a secure
place (personalization place is usually certified by schemes or
performed in trusted environments).
Attack is not applicable if personalization is done by OTA through
SCP80/SCP81 secure channel.
Attack is not applicable over data that are encrypted using the
Data Encryption Key (DEK).
Q4: What are the recommendations to be applied?
For ongoing programs using SCP02, the GlobalPlatform Security Task
Force recommends the following simple rules:
- Use ICV encryption recommendation from
GPC_FAQ_021;
- Encrypt all sensitive data transmitted
in SCP02 using the Data Encryption Key (DEK) or any applet
key;
- Disable SCP02 if there is no need to
update the card in the field;
- Add SCP03 in the card platform to be
able to smoothly switch to AES crypto.
Restricting the use of SCP02 to trusted environment can also be
considered as a valid alternative.
As a reminder, the SCP02 Global Platform Statement is the
following:
In March 2018, GlobalPlatform has
issued a security informative note about the evolution of the
trends related to the Secure Channel Protocol 02 (a.k.a. SCP02)
specified in the Card Specification document.
GlobalPlatform organization set as deprecated this protocol in the
current version of GlobalPlatform specification (Card Specification
v2.3.1).
Refer to the GlobalPlatform recommendations as described in the
informative note:
https://www.globalplatform.org/documents/Security_Informative_Note1_FINAL.pdf
About us
Eurosmart, the Voice of the Digital Security Industry, is an
international non-profit association located in Brussels, representing the Digital Security
Industry for multisector applications. Founded in 1995, the
association is committed to expanding the world's Digital secure
devices market, developing smart security standards and
continuously improving the quality of security applications.
Our members
Members are manufacturers of secure element, semiconductors, smart
cards, secure software, High Security Hardware and terminals,
biometric technology providers, system integrators, application
developers and issuers.
Eurosmart members are companies (Fingerprint Cards, Gemalto,
Giesecke+Devrient, GS TAG, IDEMIA, IN GROUPE, Infineon
Technologies, Inside Secure, Internet of Trust, Linxens, Nedcard,
NXP Semiconductors, +ID, Real Casa de la Moneda, Samsung, Sanoïa,
STMicroelectronics, Toshiba, Trusted Objects, WISekey, Winbond),
laboratories (CEA-LETI, Keolabs), research organisations
(Fraunhofer AISEC), associations (SCS Innovation cluster, Smart
Payment Association, Mobismart, Danish Biometrics).
SOURCE Eurosmart