Sends Letter to Shareholders Highlighting
Enzo’s Sustained History of Underperformance and Missteps of
Current Entrenched Board and Management Team
Believes Current Leadership Has Operated Enzo
as a “Lifestyle Business” With Its Own Interests Placed Ahead of
Shareholders’
HDF’s Director Candidates – Fabian Blank and
Peter Clemens – Can Help Address Depressed Stock Price and Create
Significant Value for All Shareholders
Full letter available at
https://cureenzo.com/
Harbert Discovery Fund, LP and Harbert Discovery Co-Investment
Fund I, LP (collectively “HDF”), the beneficial owner of more than
11.8% of the outstanding shares of Enzo Biochem, Inc. (NYSE: ENZ)
(“Enzo” or the “Company”), announced today in a detailed letter to
shareholders that it is nominating two director candidates for
election to the Company’s Board of Directors (the “Board”) at its
2019 Annual Meeting of Shareholders.
This press release features multimedia. View
the full release here:
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190917005689/en/
Image 1: Total Shareholder Return.
(Photo: Business Wire)
The full text of the letter follows:
September 17, 2019
Dear Fellow Shareholders,
Harbert Discovery Fund, LP and Harbert Discovery Co-Investment
Fund I, LP (collectively “HDF”) currently own approximately 11.8%
of the outstanding shares of Enzo Biochem, Inc. (NYSE: ENZ) (“Enzo”
or the “Company”), making us the Company’s largest shareholder.
We are writing today because we believe Enzo is deeply
undervalued. This depressed valuation is, in our view, a direct
result of the Company’s current Board of Directors’ (the “Board”)
and management team’s persistent inability to execute Enzo’s stated
strategy, deliver on the promises of the Company’s technology and
manage the cost structure of the business prudently.
For decades, Enzo has operated as a “lifestyle business,” where
management has seemingly placed its own personal and financial
interests ahead of its shareholders’ best interests. The Board has
repeatedly let this behavior go unchecked and has failed to hold
management accountable for its clear inability to deliver
profitable growth or acceptable absolute or relative shareholder
returns.
Enzo’s underperformance is not a matter of perspective or a
story requiring nuance: the Company has drastically underperformed
the Russell 2000 by nearly 1,100% over the last 30 years. Clearly,
it is time for change. This is why over the last several months we
have attempted to engage in substantive, private discussions with
the Company regarding the composition of the Board, in an effort to
install new independent directors who can help address the
Company’s problems. Unfortunately, the Board’s ultimate response to
our discussions was unproductive, and we are now forced to pursue
other options to ensure that shareholders are properly represented
in the Board room.
We are nominating two highly-qualified Board candidates – Fabian
Blank and Peter Clemens – for election at the 2019 Annual Meeting
of Shareholders (the “Annual Meeting”). These independent
candidates have deep operational, financial and strategic
experience within the healthcare industry. Having already studied
Enzo and the challenges it faces, both candidates are prepared to
bring their substantive experience to bear to help steer the
Company in the direction of long-term value creation for all
shareholders. HDF believes our candidates can immediately help
improve the Company’s expense structure and implement a growth
strategy that will generate durable long-term shareholder value.
Our nominees also are well-positioned to create near-term value
through a full exploration of strategic alternatives, with a focus
on potential sales of non-core assets and intellectual
property.
The Case for Change at
Enzo
Sustained History of Value Destruction:
It is our belief that management and the Board’s misguided
strategy and failure to execute coupled with an excessive,
misaligned and unjustifiable compensation structure has resulted in
consistent value destruction for shareholders, as evidenced by
Enzo’s stock price which has significantly underperformed any
relevant index or peer group comparison across any time period,
going back 30 years. See Image 1: Total Shareholder Return.
History of Overpromising and Underdelivering:
Management has a long track record of hyping various platforms
and technologies in development, only to fail to deliver the
promised results. While this pattern is systemic and has repeated
itself for decades, the debacle with AmpiProbe provides a current
and salient example of this disappointing phenomenon.
Since 2012, Enzo has briefed investors on its strategy to roll
out a new lower cost lab-to-lab business model derived from the
development of AmpiProbe:
- 2012 – Management first highlighted AmpiProbe and its
significant potential in March during its second quarter earnings
call.
- 2014 – Two years after the original promise of
AmpiProbe, during the fiscal Q4 2014 earnings call in October,
management stated in reference to AmpiProbe, “We hope to see the
first of these tests available for marketing sometime after the
first of the calendar year.”
- 2015 – The Company’s December investor presentation
referred to the potential of AmpiProbe to deliver cost savings to
the market, stating, “Enzo Is Positioned to Thrive NOW.”
- 2016 – AmpiProbe had still not progressed. On the fiscal
Q3 2016 earnings call held in June, management stated, “I think we
are in fairly good shape to hopefully see a comprehensive product
sometime by year end or soon thereafter. And what I mean by
comprehensive product is a panel that can potentially generate
revenue growth for us as a company of some size.”
- 2018 – Two and a half years later on the fiscal Q1 2019
earnings call held in December 2018, management stated, “We have
been working to now build systems that not only will be approved
for a New York State approval, but also for an FDA approval and
that is very important in the totality of this process and we are
moving forward in that.” This comment is particularly objectionable
considering management initially indicated that FDA approval would
not be required, claiming New York State approval would
suffice.
Despite its statements over the past seven years that AmpiProbe
would drive growth and profitability for Enzo, as of today,
AmpiProbe has not generated any material
revenue for the Company. In fact, Enzo’s revenues declined
from $103 million in fiscal 2012 to $87 million in the LTM period
ended April 30, 2019.2
Similar to its failed promises about new products generating
growth, for years management has repeatedly pointed to strategic
partnerships as a source of growth – yet nothing has ever come to
fruition.
- 2014 – “We continue to look for effective least
dilutive ways to monetize many of the transformational technologies
we have developed. And as such, we continue to explore joint
ventures and other forms of partnerships as a way to help advance
technologies and benefit all of us as shareholders” – Barry
Weiner Q3 2014 Earnings Call.
- 2016 – “Establishing business relationships on many
fronts is a key goal of the many goals that we have set forth for
our team here. We are in dialog with multiple parties. We are
fortunate that we have many platform technologies that appeal and
touch on different segments of this particular marketplace and we
are looking to expand those platforms into areas where we may not
have the interest or the time or the focus to expand the utility of
the platforms. And so we are in dialog. And you could very well see
the consummation of relationships with a number of parties out
there in the near future.” – Barry Weiner Q4 2016 Earnings
Call.
- 2018 – “Finally, we have been developing cost effective
approaches on various platforms, not only in molecular, but in the
area of anatomical pathology, immunohistochemistry, in flow
cytometry these various platforms and business opportunities that
are under development, provide from multiple unique opportunities
to partner and joint venture to exploit the commercialization
capability that they present and dialog is now currently underway
to try to move these products in a more expeditious way.” – Barry
Weiner Q4 2018 Earnings Call.
- 2019 – “Our commercial efforts towards implementing our
marketing plan is twofold, expanding our internal highly trained
and technical sales teams and supplementing this effort with a
focused business development program to partner, collaborate and/or
combine with companies in the diagnostic testing market. In the
past quarter alone we’ve held numerous discussions with many
strategic partners, many of whom we’ve met with over the last year.
Defining the scope of new relationships and building collaborations
and partnerships takes time. However, Enzo’s disruptive strategic
plan is gaining market awareness and acceptance and we are
confident new relationships will materialize.” – Barry Weiner Q2
2019 Earnings Call.
We have identified dozens of Company quotes substantively
similar to the above. Despite all of these statements, to date the
Company has not announced any material strategic partnerships,
further illuminating the same pattern of hype and failure that the
Board has overseen for years.
This is, in our view, the behavior of a leadership team more
concerned with the self-perpetuation of a “lifestyle business” than
with delivering results to shareholders, and of a Board that has
failed to provide effective oversight for years.
Failed Corporate Governance:
Enzo’s corporate governance is structured to maintain the status
quo and benefit insiders at the expense all other stakeholders. The
over-tenured Board has approved a misguided strategy and not held
management accountable for years of underperformance. It is widely
accepted that boards that follow corporate governance best
practices make better decisions that result in positive outcomes
for all shareholders. They clearly define a company’s strategy and
hold the management team accountable for delivering on that
strategy. Enzo desperately needs fresh perspective in the boardroom
in order to address numerous governance deficiencies,
including:
- Dual Chairman/CEO as compared to the overwhelming majority of
Russell 3000 companies that have separated the two positions;3
- Chairman/CEO holds a 44-year tenure;
- CFO is on the Board with a running 43-year tenure;
- Average director tenure is 20+ years as compared to an average
of 11-13 years for the Russell 3000;4
- Average director age is 65;
- Classified Board as compared to the majority of Russell 3000
companies that elect all their directors annually;5 and
- Shareholders do not have the right to call a special
meeting.
Excessive Compensation for Underperformance:
Consistent losses of shareholder value, consistent promises of
successes just around the corner that never seem to arrive and a
consistent lack of oversight at the Board level appear to be the
hallmarks of Enzo.
Enzo has reported operating losses every year since 2004, with
cumulative negative operating income of -$180 million, excluding
legal expenses and settlements. Yet, during this same period, the
Board approved paying Chairman / CEO Elazar Rabbani and his
brother-in-law CFO Barry Weiner nearly $32 million, including a
bonus every single year. This figure does not include the annual
related-party payments Mr. Rabbani and Mr. Weiner receive in
exchange for leasing the Farmingdale lab facility to the Company.
In 2018, Mr. Rabbani and Mr. Weiner each received roughly $600,000
under this arrangement. Additionally, in 2018 while the stock
cratered -59% over the course of the year, Mr. Rabbani and Mr.
Weiner were paid $2.7 million not including the related party
payments.
We believe this unacceptable performance coupled with Enzo’s
hallmark of declining profitability is a direct result of
management’s defective strategy and lack of execution, making the
excessive compensation even more troubling. A truly independent and
competent Board would not reward management for such dramatic
long-term fundamental underperformance, and would instead have long
ago aligned leadership’s compensation plan with the level of value
generated for shareholders.
The Opportunity at Enzo
In spite of the decades of poor oversight and mismanagement,
Enzo has a collection of businesses and assets that, with a sound
growth strategy, more prudent expense structure, appropriate
capital allocation, and effective, independent oversight could be
worth significantly more than the value currently ascribed by the
market.
The bulk of the value at Enzo could be unlocked through three
factors:
- A new corporate strategy that acknowledges Enzo’s strengths and
weaknesses as well as the broader market realities;
- A sale of non-core assets; and
- Once Enzo is generating cash, return of excess cash to
shareholders.
Enzo’s attempts to launch a new model for the diagnostic
marketplace has overburdened the business with unnecessary
expenses. Enzo has neither the scale nor the expertise to execute
on this strategy and attempting to do so puts the whole enterprise
at risk. Enzo is too small today and building out a sales force
would be too costly for Enzo to successfully market the “labs to
labs” business whereby Enzo will serve as the “central capability”
for smaller labs.6 Investor’s recognition of this fact is a
significant factor of the share price underperformance over the
years.
Instead, Enzo should focus on the inherent strengths of its
lab’s location in a high-density population market and strong
relationships with existing customers. Building on those two
strengths coupled with prudent cost cuts could return that segment
to profitability.
With respect to the life sciences division, Enzo is correct to
look to strategic partnerships to accelerate growth. The failure to
consummate any meaningful partnerships over the years is, we
believe, a result of management failures and weak Board oversight
as well as Enzo’s highly litigious reputation in the industry.
Without change, shareholders will continue to see the pattern of
promises without follow-through. However, we believe the vast
expertise and extensive networks of our candidates will put Enzo in
a position to execute strategic partnerships that can quickly
accelerate growth in the life sciences division.
Enzo has a very valuable patent portfolio of 343 patents and 157
patents pending as evidenced by $117 million of settlements since
2001. Unfortunately, Enzo’s legal expenses over that period were
$99 million.7 Not only has decades of patent litigation at Enzo
harmed the Company’s reputation, impairing its ability to form
partnerships for growth, but the litigation has not produced an
attractive return for shareholders. Instead of continuing to
litigate, Enzo should look to monetize non-core patents. This would
provide an immediate, substantial cash inflow to the business,
while also signaling to potential strategic partners that Enzo is
looking to work together in good faith in the future.
The therapeutics division has value to a strategic buyer, but at
Enzo it has proved to be a distraction to management and the
Company as a whole. Instead of periodically promoting one potential
therapy or another, only to see it fail to progress beyond a Phase
I or Phase II trial, Enzo should sell the division to a buyer with
a proven track record of successful therapeutic development.
Divesting therapeutics would provide the best risk adjusted value
for Enzo shareholders.
Following the right sizing of the clinical services cost
structure, accelerated growth in the life sciences division, the
sale of non-core IP, and the sale of the therapeutics division,
Enzo could have a cash balance that matches or exceeds the current
market capitalization of the business today. Under those
assumptions, shareholders are getting $87 million of revenue for
free today when peers for the clinical services division and life
sciences division trade for roughly 2.2x revenue and 6.5x revenue,
respectively. Applying those multiples to each segment implies
nearly 3x upside from the current share price.
Clearly, there is substantial opportunity at Enzo for all
shareholders. However, the current, misguided strategy is resulting
in increasing expenses and a declining cash balance. The current
Board cannot, in our view, achieve Enzo’s full potential. Immediate
change is needed.
Our Solution for Enzo
It is our view that Enzo’s Board is entrenched, detached and
more focused on self-perpetuation than the concerns of other
shareholders. Its seeming acceptance of negative returns, insider
dealings, and constant misallocation of capital is simply
unacceptable. Each day the current Board remains in place the
status quo continues – and shareholders suffer.
HDF believes two new independent directors will be able to
refocus Enzo’s Board and swiftly deliver value for shareholders.
After an extensive search, HDF has identified two extremely
qualified Board candidates who we believe, upon election and
subject to their fiduciary duties, will:
- Bring new and necessary perspectives to the Board;
- Develop a better strategic plan for the business;
- Be immediately impactful in addressing the Company’s bloated
cost structure;
- Hold management accountable for its performance;
- Deliver on the potential of strategic partnerships to grow the
business;
- Restructure executive compensation in a manner that is aligned
with shareholder interests; and
- Evaluate the full range of strategic alternatives available to
create shareholder value.
HDF’s highly-qualified director candidates, who will truly
represent and act in the best interests of all shareholders, will
realign the Company’s operating and growth strategy and create
significant value at Enzo, are:
Fabian Blank: Healthcare Advisor and Investor
Operational Expertise – Substantial operational and growth
experience in healthcare space
- Mr. Blank is a senior healthcare executive with a broad and
diversified operational background across multiple areas of the
healthcare industry and substantial experience advising companies
like Enzo on healthcare strategy, digitalization, disruption, and
growth.
- Mr. Blank is an Independent Non-Executive Director of Georgia
Healthcare Group PLC, an integrated healthcare group that is prime
listed on the London Stock Exchange. His primary focus is on
guiding the group through its digitalization and growth ambitions
across its services-, pharma-, laboratory- and insurance
assets.
- Mr. Blank serves as an Advisory Board Member of GYANT.com, a
US-based health tech company providing artificial intelligence
enabled patient engagement services to HMOs and other healthcare
players. He is particularly focused on establishing the company’s
business in Europe.
- Mr. Blank is the Non-Executive Chairman of Recover Health Ltd.,
an Israeli digital health startup focused on developing a digital
platform to increase the quality of life of both stroke survivors
and caregivers.
- From 2013 to 2016, Mr. Blank was the CEO and Co-owner of the
Meduna Klinik Group, a privately held clinic group specialized on
post-acute services. He successfully grew revenues and EBITDA in a
highly competitive market before consummating a successful sale to
a private equity buyer.
- From 2000 to 2013, he was at McKinsey & Company, Inc.,
where he also served as a Partner of the firm. He served technology
and healthcare clients from various settings of acute, rehab, labs
or polyclinics on growth topics, with operational presence in over
20 countries.
- He holds a graduate business management degree (Diplom
Kaufmann) from the HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management and
completed additional studies at University of Trier, Boston
University’s Questrom School of Business and ESADE in Barcelona,
Spain.
Peter (Pete) Clemens: Director of Vituro Health
Financial Expertise – Public healthcare company CFO
- Mr. Clemens has a distinguished career in healthcare serving in
multiple senior finance roles and is a two-time public company
healthcare CFO with significant turnaround, growth, operational,
and M&A experience. During his tenures, shareholders of his
past companies saw annualized returns of 33.7% and 38.0%,
respectively.
- He is currently the Director of Vituro Health and Chairman of
the Samford University Board of Overseers.
- From 2011 to 2015, Mr. Clemens served as the CFO of Surgical
Care Affiliates, providing valuable guidance through an IPO
process, transitioning from private equity ownership, and several
years of robust growth for the company.
- From 1995 to 2010, he worked at Caremark where he held multiple
senior finance roles for over 15 years and was CFO of the company
as they successfully completed a $21B merger of equals with CVS
Corporation after over a decade of tremendous growth and outsized
returns to shareholders.
- Mr. Clemens previously served on the board of DSI Renal, a
privately-owned dialysis company that was sold to Fresenius in
September of 2011.
- Mr. Clemens began his career in credit and lending roles at
both AmSouth Bank and Wachovia Bank.
- He holds a Bachelor’s degree from Samford University and an MBA
in Finance from Vanderbilt University.
The status quo is not what Enzo needs. We believe the current
Board lacks the leadership, objectivity and perspective to hold
management accountable and make decisions that are in the best
interests of all shareholders. For months, HDF has attempted to
engage in productive dialogue with the Company to reconstruct the
Board. Our strong preference was to work privately in a
constructive manner with the goal of greatly improving corporate
governance while attempting to avoid the difficulties and
distractions of a proxy battle. The Company’s response has been
unproductive and discouraging, while highlighting the deep-seated
issues resulting from the Company’s lack of leadership and
oversight.
Without shareholder involvement, we believe management will
continue to benefit as shareholders continue to suffer. Therefore,
we are nominating our candidates for election to the Board at the
2019 Annual Meeting of Shareholders.
Sincerely,
Harbert Discovery Fund, LP
Harbert Discovery Co-Investment Fund I, LP
Kenan Lucas, Managing Director and Portfolio Manager of Harbert
Discovery Fund GP, LLC and Harbert Discovery Co-Investment Fund I
GP, LLC
SECURITY HOLDERS ARE ADVISED TO READ THE PROXY STATEMENT AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE SOLICITATION OF PROXIES FROM THE
STOCKHOLDERS OF ENZO BIOCHEM, INC. BY HARBERT DISCOVERY FUND, LP,
HARBERT DISCOVERY FUND GP, LLC, HARBERT DISCOVERY CO-INVESTMENT
FUND I, LP, HARBERT DISCOVERY CO-INVESTMENT FUND I GP, LLC, HARBERT
FUND ADVISORS, INC., HARBERT MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, JACK BRYANT,
KENAN LUCAS, AND RAYMOND HARBERT WHEN THEY BECOME AVAILABLE BECAUSE
THEY WILL CONTAIN IMPORTANT INFORMATION, INCLUDING INFORMATION
RELATING TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN SUCH PROXY SOLICITATION. WHEN
COMPLETED, A DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT AND A FORM OF PROXY WILL BE
MAILED TO STOCKHOLDERS OF ENZO BIOCHEM, INC. AND WILL ALSO BE
AVAILABLE AT NO CHARGE AT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S
WEBSITE AT HTTP://WWW.SEC.GOV. INFORMATION RELATING TO THE
PARTICIPANTS IN SUCH PROXY SOLICITATION IS CONTAINED IN THE
SCHEDULE 13D, AS ORIGINALLY FILED ON APRIL 8, 2019 AND AS MOST
RECENTLY AMENDED ON SEPTEMBER 17, 2019. EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE
DISCLOSED IN SUCH SCHEDULE 13D, THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE NO INTEREST
IN ENZO BIOCHEM, INC.
Important Disclosure THIS STATEMENT CONTAINS OUR CURRENT
VIEWS ON THE VALUE OF SECURITIES OF ENZO BIOCHEM, INC. (“ENZO”).
OUR VIEWS ARE BASED ON OUR ANALYSIS OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
INFORMATION AND ASSUMPTIONS WE BELIEVE TO BE REASONABLE. THERE CAN
BE NO ASSURANCE THAT THE INFORMATION WE CONSIDERED IS ACCURATE OR
COMPLETE, NOR CAN THERE BE ANY ASSURANCE THAT OUR ASSUMPTIONS ARE
CORRECT. WE DO NOT RECOMMEND OR ADVISE, NOR DO WE INTEND TO
RECOMMEND OR ADVISE, ANY PERSON TO PURCHASE OR SELL SECURITIES AND
NO ONE SHOULD RELY ON THIS STATEMENT OR ANY ASPECT OF THIS
STATEMENT TO PURCHASE OR SELL SECURITIES OR CONSIDER PURCHASING OR
SELLING SECURITIES. THIS STATEMENT DOES NOT PURPORT TO BE, NOR
SHOULD IT BE READ, AS AN EXPRESSION OF ANY OPINION OR PREDICTION AS
TO THE PRICE AT WHICH ENZO’S SECURITIES MAY TRADE AT ANY TIME. AS
NOTED, THIS STATEMENT EXPRESSES OUR CURRENT VIEWS ON ENZO. OUR
VIEWS AND OUR HOLDINGS COULD CHANGE AT ANY TIME WITHOUT NOTICE AND
WE MAKE NO COMMITMENT TO UPDATE THIS STATEMENT IN THE EVENT OUR
VIEWS OR HOLDINGS CHANGE. INVESTORS SHOULD MAKE THEIR OWN DECISIONS
REGARDING ENZO AND ITS PROSPECTS WITHOUT RELYING ON, OR EVEN
CONSIDERING, ANY OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS
STATEMENT.
About Harbert Discovery Fund (HDF) HDF invests in a
concentrated portfolio of publicly traded small capitalization
companies in the US and Canada. We perform significant due
diligence on each portfolio company prior to investing. In addition
to researching all publicly available information and meeting with
management, our diligence includes substantial primary research
with industry experts, consultants, bankers, customers and
competitors. We often spend months or years researching ideas
before making an investment decision and we only invest in
companies that we believe are significantly undervalued, and where
there is the potential for change to enhance or accelerate value
creation. In an effort to unlock this potential value, we seek to
work directly with the boards and management teams of our portfolio
companies privately and collaboratively, engaging with them on a
range of factors including governance, board composition, corporate
strategy, capital allocation, strategic alternatives and
operations. We have effected positive, fundamental changes at our
current and past investments through this behind-the-scenes,
constructive approach. HDF currently has board representation at
three of our portfolio companies. In each case, changes to the
board were agreed upon privately and it is our strong preference in
every investment to avoid the unnecessary distractions and costs of
a public proxy campaign.
About Harbert Management Corporation (HMC) HMC is an
alternative asset management firm with approximately $6.6 billion
in regulatory assets under management as of September 1, 2019. HMC
currently sponsors nine distinct investment strategies with
dedicated investment teams. Additional information about HMC can be
found at www.harbert.net.
1Source: Bloomberg as of August 31, 2019.
Note: 2018 Proxy Peer Group performance calculated as an equal
weight index.
2 Source: Company filings.
3
https://www.russellreynolds.com/en/Insights/thought-leadership/Documents/TCB-Corporate-Board-Practices-2019.pdf
4
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/05/07/corporate-board-practices-in-the-sp-500-and-russell-3000-2019-edition/
5 All of the five largest U.S. mutual funds, the Council of
Institutional Investors, the largest public pension funds, and the
leading proxy advisory firms (ISS and Glass Lewis) have adopted
policies that support the annual election of directors and oppose
board classification. See proxy voting guidelines for Fidelity,
Vanguard, American Funds, Franklin Mutual Advisers, and T. Rowe
Price; Council of Institutional Investors, Policies on Corporate
Governance (2016); CalPERS, Global Principles of Accountable
Corporate Governance (2010); Institutional Shareholder Services,
U.S. Proxy Voting Summary Guidelines (2013), and Glass Lewis &
Co., Proxy Paper Guidelines.
6 Enzo third quarter and nine months operating results press
release dated June 10, 2019.
7 SEC filings.
View source
version on businesswire.com: https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190917005689/en/
Investor Contact Okapi Partners LLC Bruce Goldfarb /
Chuck Garske / Jason Alexander, 212-297-0720 info@okapipartners.com
Media Contact Sloane & Company Dan Zacchei / Sarah
Braunstein, 212-486-9500 dzacchei@sloanepr.com /
sbraunstein@sloanepr.com
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