The Really Useful Gold Thread

Hi Fewfob, Crystal & all. Here are some words about North Korea by my favourite B-Logger, John J.Reilly of New Jersey. He's an amateur commentator, but well connected I believe.

"The [N.Korean] national grid is not even set up to use any power the plant might produce. The reactor is an extortion engine. That's all it's for."

I suppose there must be some way to check that.

(page may update. See Archive)

December 26, 2002

Blind Eyes

Now that the North Koreans have provoked a nuclear crisis, one of the wonders of the season is the sudden realization among the media commentariat that the United States might have to fight two wars simultaneously, on the east and west side of Asia. The mention of the possibility by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at a recent press conference seems to have been the first that many of them had heard of the idea, even though it has been the central strategic issue since the end of the Cold War. The Progressive position was that a military prepared for major wars in two theaters was an expensive anachronism after the Soviet Union ended. Some strategists said that more than one war at once was "unlikely," as if wars were purely statistical phenomena, not political acts.

Today's perfectly predictable state of affairs has caused mass cluelessness among Asia experts, even Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institute, who has otherwise been sensible on subjects like missile defense. In a recent interview with National Public Radio , he has said that the United States cannot "close its eyes" to events on the Korean Peninsula by refusing to talk to North Korea. Rather, the US must continue to ship oil and food to North Korea. In other words, the US should continue to honor its half of the agreement on which the North Koreans reneged regarding the development of nuclear weapons. The US must further engage in "continuous dialogue" with North Korea, with an eye to reaching a "really tough" diplomatic agreement, under which they would promise again not to make nuclear weapons, or at least not to make any more.

"Closing your eyes" to a situation means that you take no account of what happens in the real world. That is precisely what too many Asia experts are insisting on; they say the US should proceed as if North Korea had not broken its treaty obligations on a life-or-death issue. It is also hard to see what a "tough" diplomatic solution might entail. Might we threaten to cut off the oil if North Korea starts up its breeder reactor again, like we are doing already?

They did not restart the reactor because the lack of oil left them no alternative. The energy issue is a red herring. The national grid is not even set up to use any power the plant might produce. The reactor is an extortion engine. That's all it's for.

As for the humanitarian issue, there would be some point in maintaining food shipments to North Korea if that would actually alleviate the famine. However, the fact is we know, from experience, that the North Korean government is less interested in ending famine than in managing it. Any measure that keeps the current government in power simply prolongs the misery.

The US should allow the North Koreans to follow unimpeded the road to perdition they have chosen for themselves. North Korea has beggared itself to gain the measure of deterrence that comes from possessing a few nuclear weapons. May they have joy of it. Short of a serious hostile act by North Korea against the US or a US ally (which must include an attempt to export a nuke), the US can refrain from all military action against North Korea. If the North Koreans want oil or food, they have to pay for it, with concessions or money in advance. If they want to talk, then by all means let us talk to them. Just don't give them anything in exchange for mere dialogue.

If the new, accommodationist government in South Korea thinks otherwise, then let them offer what aid they will. The inveterate mendacity of the North will soon appall them to a better opinion.

The goal of our policy must be to shorten the time before the North Korean regime implodes. It is entirely possible that some of the fragments from that event will be nuclear. Frankly, it is better for the implosion to occur sooner, when the fragments are few, rather than later, when they will be many.